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I. NARRATIVES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT
AND DIVERSITY N THE ACADEMY

A. ProfessionalAffiliations
A young minority scholar writes an article over 200 pages on the theory
of conflict of laws. He is appointed a member of the Committee of the
AALS Conflict of Laws Section. He has ideas about globalism and the
conflict of laws. These ideas may have anticipated the trend toward
globalism and the importance of the rules of private international law in
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giving some coherence to the legal aspects of globalism. He suggests that
future panels of the Section might focus on the international aspects of
American private international law. The Chair, in conversations with the
minority scholar, tries to put the matter off and suggests that the Executive
Committee might discuss the issue at the next annual AALS meeting.
Since our minority colleague is next in line to be a nominated chair of the
Section, a meeting is scheduled for early in the morning, prior to the
Section meeting, in order to officially approve his nomination as Chair.
The following morning's breakfast meeting fails to transpire because the
current Chair fails to appear. Our minority colleague scurries to the
Section meeting in a vein effort to find the Chair. The Chair is nowhere to
be found. About five minutes after the Section's deliberations should have
commenced, the Chair finally appears. When approached by our minority
colleague, the Chair physically pushes him aside and charges past him to
the podium. He immediately calls for nominations from the floor. He
"settles" upon recognizing a prearranged "friend" to nominate another
"friend" and quickly puts an end to the episode. The shocked minority
member leaves the Section and in the twenty years that have passed since
that sinister event, has never attended another AALS Conflict of Laws
Section meeting. He still does conflicts work but with colleagues in
Europe.
B. Affirmative Action and University Policy
At a University in the early 1990's, a perception surfaced in higher
administration circles that affirmative action (diversity) was doomed. The
University, like the Nation, was going through a transitional period, and
political orthodoxies of the day seemed to be influenced by the agenda of
the radical right. It became apparent to senior members of the Association
of Black Faculty that they were getting conflicting signals about the
recruitment and retention of African-American faculty. Some
administrators claimed to be committed to diversity and increasing the
African-American presence on campus. Other administrators were sending
lukewarm signals about the same issues. A minority faculty member from
the law school was asked by a group of senior African American faculty
to meet with the President and secure his support for the policy of
attracting and keeping an African-American presence on campus.
At the meeting with the President, the minority faculty member got to
the point with dispatch. He asked the President whether he would be
willing to take a visible leadership role on the issue of diversity and
affirmative action. The President responded with the following question:
"Why should I?" The faculty member suggested that among other things,
good race relations in a University setting is something that any
administrator should value highly. The President raised a theoretical
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question of whether it was possible to translate a value ("ought") into a
policy ("is") in the context of higher education decisionmaking. It so
happens that this particular faculty member had written extensively on the
precise point of what intellectual procedures can and should be used to
ground value judgments in circumstances of particular application. He
suggested to the President that he was fully aware of the epistemological
implications of his statement and that this was an issue the President could
not win from an intellectual standpoint. The President exploded, telling the
minority faculty member that, on the contrary, he would intellectually
"whip" that faculty member. With the temperature rising considerably, the
tension was broken with an interruption from a telephone call from the
President's boss. When he returned his attention to the faculty member, the
President pointed out that he appreciated faculty members who could
intellectually stand up for themselves. However, the President stated that
he was no longer bound by affirmative action (diversity) in terms of
University policy. The faculty member then asked him whether the court
order directing the University to desegregate had been modified or
terminated. The President responded by asking what court order he was
talking about. The faculty member then indicated that there was a standing
court order and that, as of the previous day when he had looked into the
situation, it had not been terminated. Therefore, he suggested that if the
University, in repudiating affirmative action, was also to be seen as
repudiating the court desegregation order, the President, the University,
and the State could find themselves in a legally embarrassing position. He
recommended that those who had advised the President that the court's
order no longer bound the University should at least explain the basis of
their advice to him. At this point, the meeting was terminated.
When the minority faculty member returns to the law school, he is met
in the hallway by a minority administrator. The administrator says to him,
"Professor, what on Earth happened over there?" He says, "Nothing
much," to which the administrator replies that the President had called the
Dean of the law school to determine what the basis was for the advice he
had received, which stated the University was no longer bound by the
Court order. The Dean admitted that the Court order had not been
terminated, but suggested that inaction provided a plausible case for
construing the order as no longer binding on the University. This answer
was quite disconcerting to the President, and he quickly responded by
eliminating a minimally publicized committee established by the Dean of
the law school whose objective was to provide a rationale for the
repudiation of affirmative action and diversity.
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C. The College of Law and the Rule of Law
A minority faculty member receives a grant from the government to
enhance human rights and rule of law development in an African
university. The law school and the University sign the agreement and
protocols with the relevant government agency. The minority faculty
member is a co-principal investigator of the project. The project is deemed
a great success by external and governmental evaluators. It is evaluated as
number one of some one-hundred projects world-wide.
The project involved (1) an effort to improve the basics of legal
education and curriculum development, (2) development of human rights
and interdisciplinary curricular innovation, (3) the creation of a human
rights library, human rights center, and a human rights journal, (4)
outreach and clinical activity, and (5) increased research and graduate
level development. An article is devoted to the project in the prestigious
Journal of Higher Education and an article about the project is published
in The Economist.
The minority faculty member hears from colleagues that the Dean
cannot understand why he is wasting his time on this project. He is
summoned to appear before the Dean to explain why the law school
(through that faculty member) is engaged in this kind of project. The
following is a recreation of the conversation.
Dean: What has this project got to do with the priorities of
this law school? Why are you spending your faculty time
(after hours) on this project?
Minority FacultyMember: This is a project approved by the
law school and the University.
Dean: That does not interest us. Why should this law school
be identified with this project?
MinorityFacultyMember: Have you heard of the rule of law?
Dean: What's that got to do with our concerns?
Minority Faculty Member: Have you heard of the ABA?
Have you heard of the CEELI initiative? Do you know the
ABA supports legal development in Eastern Europe and
Africa? Do you understand that these projects are justified by
that organization's commitment to the international rule of
law? Do you realize that the moral foundations of legal
education here are supposed to support the rule of law idea?
Dean: Well we're not attacking you, we just wanted to know
what it was all about.
Later, the Associate Dean shows up and says, "We do not
want you to contribute your time and efforts to help in the
development of the new journal you established under the
grant."
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11. KRONMAN ON DIvERSiTY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Dean Kronman's essay' on diversity in higher education is at once
powerfully insightful and correspondingly complex. Indeed, with a
concept as malleable as diversity, the discourse he seeks to promote can
at times be quite slippery. The essay underscores the important way in
which the national public discourse about affirmative action and diversity
has to a substantial degree been legalized. By legalizing the discourse, we
in turn also predetermine the scope of the facts about racial prejudice in
the United States as well as the normative horizons that should guide our
pathway through the thicket of racism and racial deprivation. In effect, this
permits the public discourse to be infected with legal signs and symbols
invariably couched in an adversarial style and formulated with a keen eye
to the litigation context.
This style of discourse has in my view captured the process of how we
communicate meaningfully about matters of racism, deprivation, and
social justice. Indeed, race relations matters are about a core discourse
concerning the basic or fundamental values and moral precepts of
American civilization. Although legal discourse is important, and words
carry more weight coming from the mouths ofjurists than from the mouths
of social scientists or novelists, law can at times obscure rather than
illuminate real public policy issues. In my view, the discourse about race
relations in the United States has been regrettably a discourse that has
thrown more darkness than light on the central question which challenges
the public order of the United States. That issue is the role of race and
social justice in the discourse about the being and becoming of the kind of
public order that law is supposed to defend and enhance. On the whole,
Dean Kronman's essay makes an important contribution to illumination
rather than darkness in this important matter.
Dean Kronman's essay is essentially a narrative divided into four parts.
The first part covers the well-understood political divide that posits
diversity as a polarizing principle with its partisan groups on the left and
right. Kronman believes that by the application of insight, reason, and
philosophical sophistication, one can carve out a middle position which
may not satisfy either side in the partisan debate, but which might make
a practical contribution to the possibility that partisans in conflict tend to
operate with overblown premises (I should add here that a part of my
comment is devoted to a critique and possible deconstruction of the
narrative implicit in Kronman's essay of the parameters about precisely

1. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?,52 FLA.

L. REV. 861 (2000).
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this kind of debate and the importance of whether the liberal middle is
really the middle).2
The second part of Kronman's essay works on a sophisticated
distinction in the higher education context between values that are
"internal" and "external," and those values which are clearly inherent in
whatever moral meaning we give to the concept of diversity. Here
Kronman makes a particularly strong argument that the internal goals of
higher education as seen from an internal perspective hold a compelling
(one is tempted to say) universal justification for the enhancement of
educational values.3
The third part of Kronman's narrative looks specifically at what
distinctive educational value might attach to concepts of race and
ethnicity. It is here that Kronman's narrative gets particularly interesting.
Kronman gives us a tour of certain central features of the Western tradition
of political thought and moral sensibility.4 In one way or another, we find
that the lower classes, the marginalized classes, the lumpen proletariat of
the planet, are recognized as having a moral stake in community and a
claim to social position and equity. As the argument gravitates to the
position of race, there is an empirical recognition that black and white
Americans live segregated lives. We may imply that segregation means
more than separation, for it often means deprivation. The empirical or
statistical basis of segregation suggests to Dean Kronman that we have a
problem of transitional justice. One has to be cautious about the
justification of diversity as an educational value as well as a social justice
value. Perhaps these overlap, but the implications of the overlap are not
altogether obvious. Dean Kronman looks at where his narrative has taken
him and classically expresses liberal "cautions and concerns." 5 The heart
of the matter, according to Kronman's narrative, is that diversity seems to
include a transitional racial and ethnic factor which has a kind of
transitional educational value. Furthermore, there is diversity without
regard to race which is ostensibly timeless.
Because of the breadth and sophistication of Dean Kronman' s approach
to the diversity issue, it would be difficult to comment on all of the
specifics raised in his essay without also writing a much lengthier piece.
What I am going to try to do is to provide a narrative commentary on the
Kronman piece that essentially broadens, challenges, or shifts the terms of
the debate. Let us comment briefly on why Kronman's essay is so
important to the affirmative action/diversity debate. I would submit that
Dean Kronman has written the kind of piece that seeks to preempt in an

2. See id. at 862-64.

3. See id. at 864-68.
4. See id. at 868-72.
5. Id. at 872-77.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/2

6

Nagan: Dean Kromans's Diversity Narrative: Liberal Education Ideology ve
LIBERAL EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY VERSUS SOCIAL JUSTICE

important way how we conceptualize the discourse about diversity and
affirmative action. For those who hold a strong ideological antipathy to the
institutions validated by the public policies of affirmative action and
diversity, preemption is particularly important. This is because the role of
the courts lurks as a brooding omnipresence over social justice questions.
Indeed, the courts have been stacked with ideologically driven appointees,
who have sought to arrest public policy relating to affirmative action and
diversity on the basis that these public policies represent racism directed
at the white majority of the United States.
In my comment, I want to challenge the generally accepted outlines of
the race, ethnicity, and affirmative action narrative. What my alternative
narrative seeks to show is that in important ways, the conventional
narrative obscured the central issues revolving around social democratic
values. I want to go further and stress that from the point of view of
intellectual responsibility, the public discourse does not seriously
comprehend the centrality of social democratic values as the cornerstone
of post war prosperity and the linkage of social prosperity to social and
racial justice. I believe there is an interesting historical parallel reflected
in the Supreme Court's long standing effort to constrain ideas of social
democratic entitlement as indicated in the litigation strategies to outlaw the
New Deal in the pre-World War II context.
As a threshold matter, it is important to add that Dean Kronman has
represented in an impressive way the importance of intellectual
responsibility in public interest matters. His essay, with considerable skill,
brings a wide range of multi-disciplinary insights which are combined with
a clarity of sophisticated philosophical analysis and a sharp practical sense
of the lawyer's capacity to both enlighten and influence the direction of
important questions of value and public policy. I see in Kronman's work
at least some elements of the pioneering scholarship of Gunnar Myrdal's
An American Dilemma.6 It will doubtlessly be recalled that Myrdal sought
to both describe and evaluate American race relations against the explicit
ideals of the political system.7 It may be that in Kronman's essay, he
continues that tradition and moves us expansively on issues of race and
ethnicity in the direction of a larger discourse about both social justice and
academic promise.
m.

INITIAL OUTLINES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE

The United States has been described as an ethnic and racial melting pot
of unmelted lumps. Many of Thomas Jefferson's blood relatives are black
and many are white. Some look white but have black relatives and, while

6. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DI-EMMA (1962).
7. See id. Part V.
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"culturally" white, could be functionally black. Vast numbers of AfricanAmericans have "white" blood, and vast numbers of whites have mixed
black/Asian and other blood lines. As a political and economic matter, if
one is white, one potentially has a brighter future in America's political
landscape. If one is black, the prospects are bleaker. A similar vista could
be statistically employed in access to and participation in the valued things
of modem society such as wealth, respect, education, labor, health, wellbeing and of course the institutions of political power. African-Americans
constitute the most conspicuous minority in the United States. Apart from
the special historical and political issues of American Indians, African
Americans have perhaps the longest and most intimate association with
racial deprivation and more. The morality of slavery and colonialism starts
long before the juridical trail of tears initiated by Chief Justice Taney in
1856. Taney's honesty however abhorrent, captures the heart and soul of
the matter. Consider briefly the following quotations from Scott v.
Sandford:8
[Clan a Negro, whose ancestors were imported into this
country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities guarantied by
that instrument to the citizen? One of these rights is the
privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases
specified in the Constitution.9
The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is,
whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be
emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become
free before their birth, are citizens of a state, in the sense in
which the word "citizen" is used in the Constitution of the
United States.'0
Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him
whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and
raised there to the rank of citizen, and immediately clothe him
with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in
its own courts?"
The court think the affirmative of these propositions
cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error
8. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,403 (1856).

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 406.
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could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and,
consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts. 2
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public
opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed
in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the
time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the
Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.
But the public history of every European nation displays it, in
a manner too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and
so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.'
The language of the Declaration of Independence is
equally conclusive:
It begins by declaring that, "when in the course of human
events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the
political bands which have connected them with another, and
to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and
equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God
entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them
to the separation."
It then proceeds to say: "We hold these truths to be selfevident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed."
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace
the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar
instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is that
the enslaved African race were not intended to be included,
and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted
this Declaration; for if the language, as understood in that
day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished
men who framed the Declaration of Independence would
have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the
principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of

12. Id.
13. Id. at 407.
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mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would
have deserved and received universal rebuke and
reprobation."' 4
Thus spoke the former Chief Justice of the United States. In so
speaking, Taney gave the imprimatur of law, justice, and moral sensibility
to the slave owners, the segregationists, and those committed to the
principles of white supremacy. DredScott is an important beginning point.
It establishes the basis of race relations discourse at ground zero in the
United States as we move from the justification of slavery via Dred Scott
to the justification of racial prejudice via Plessy v. Ferguson5 to the
justification of desegregation via Brown v. Board of Education6 to the
justification of affirmative action as an aspect of desegregation, the
undermining of affirmative action via Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke, 7 and the invention of diversity as indicated in Justice
Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke. Dean Kronman draws our attention
to "the sound observation that legal norms always operate against a
background of social and economic forces whose influence limits the law's
effectiveness as an instrument of moral change .... ,8 If we were for a
moment to step back, we might modestly change the meaning of
Kronman's statement and suggest that allied to this statement is another
basic question about the nature of law. For example, is it in the nature of
law that it responds to problems that emerge from the social context?
When we examine the legal development from DredScott to Bakke and
beyond, we may observe some curious twists in the legal doctrine. It is
especially curious that the trail of legal doctrine moves from the
vindication of slavery to the vindication of social justice to the vindication
of educational excellence. This is a rather slippery vista for anyone who
wishes to give coherence to the development of legal doctrine and who

14. Id. at 409-10. It would be an interesting exercise in understanding the semantics and
syntactics of the Supreme Court and lower courts to trace the discourse regarding race relations
from DredScott to Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). What is clear is that Taney set
the tone of the discourse and his language, repulsive as it may seem to some, resonates through time
and space. One should hesitate about comparing and contrasting contemporary terms and phrases
of current Supreme Courtjustices with Taney's language. However, when the language of Justices
on the Court proclaims the principle that Whites are victims of racial discrimination and prejudice,
one might find a subliminal but important linkage or thread to Taney's own assumptions. In terms
of result, Taney thought he was protecting Whites and White property interests, and certain justices
on the Supreme Court certainly believe that they too must protect Whites and White property
entitlements today. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,520-28 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18. Kronman, supra note I, at 862.
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wishes to appraise legal doctrine in terms of some articulable standard of
the public or common interest.
Dean Kronman's article seeks to find a working practical liberal
solution to the evolution of legal doctrines that seem to represent an
incoherent and morally fractured response to the problems of historic
injustice, transmitted trans-generationally, and the effort to infuse the
concept of citizenship with enough of the core values of human dignity to
remake the Constitutional promise of hierarchy and division into one that
aspires to the universality of equal respect for all. Dean Kronman has
sought to redefine the debate about diversity and higher education. In
doing so, he has in my view laid the seeds for a compelling discourse that
diversity itself is indeed an articulable educational value that can be
justified on educational grounds. It is politically important in my view, that
diversity itself be salvaged because its fundamental justification in my
view, weak as it may seem, is not only reflected in the defense of
educational values, but because it has become in fact, a synonym that
keeps alive the principles of the ideology of social democratic entitlement.
That is to say, it keeps alive the idea that a minimally decent society is a
society that simply does not abolish the principle of social justice on the
basis that the Constitution of the United States permits only the vindication
of negative rights rather than a position of neutrality with regard to the
vindication of positive rights. Let us more carefully examine the trail Dean
Kronman takes us through in the diversity debate.
The distinction that Dean Kronman makes in seeking to "justify"
diversity from an "internal" educational point of view is important for the
reason that Kronman himself makes explicit:
Justice Powell and others claimed that programs of
affirmative action should be viewed as making a contribution
to the advancement of the educational process itself-as
promoting an internal educational good. Colleges and
universities must have the discretion, they insisted, to weigh
this good against the costs that such programs entail and to
make the pedagogical judgments involved. And once
affirmative action is seen in this light . . . the claims of
disappointed non-minority applicants are bound to seem less
pressing, for no applicant has a right to be admitted to the
school of his or her choice so long as the applicant's rejection
can be explained as a consequence of the school's efforts to
maintain an optimal environment for teaching and learning.
By recharacterizing affirmative action as a means of
achieving an end internal to the enterprise of
education-rather than as a technique for promoting a
redistributive goal external to it-Powell and those who
followed his lead succeeded in dampening the two most
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powerful arguments against affirmative action, and initiated
the diversity debate in which we are still engaged today."
Dean Kronman does not suggest that there is no overlap between the
internal and the external viewpoint. There is. It seems to me however that
the heuristic value of the "internal" perspective on diversity in higher
education does provide greater illumination about the key moral questions
under consideration than a perspective that shifts imperceptibly between
external and internal values. As Kronman suggests, all internal and
external value implications must be appreciated. That is to say, the
importance of "external" values to "internal/external" values have
important points of overlap. From a pragmatic perspective, these
overlapping intersections about basic goals or values are an inevitable part
of the task of not only clarifying value judgement, but also using
disciplined intellectual tools to ground these value judgments (and)
perspectives in particular contexts. There are, however, important concerns
lurking in the interstices of the internal perspective which must be more
carefully assayed.
I suspect that the juridical roots of the distinction rest on the crucial
premise found in Professor H.L.A. Hart's work20 about the internal and
external aspects of law. According to Hart, the binding character of law,
according to rules, is only intelligible from an "internal" point of view.
Applying this insight to Kronman's analysis, a clever argument is
implicitly advanced that players inside the institutions of higher learning
meaningfully assay the internal values of higher education, and if these
values "bind" the producers and consumers in a way that is meaningful to
participants inside the academy, then the role of Supreme Court judges
who are "external" players and who should exercise restraint. Indeed,
external players must exercise a measure of prudential deference to these
"internal" values, lest they substitute their own inexpert opinions and
judgments on higher education for which they are essentially "external"
participants. Educational values, in short, are the province in the first place
of educators and cannot "bind" or mean the same thing for judges and
lawyers. Indeed, they morally "bind" educators (internal players) quite
differently. In short, educators are entitled to a degree of deference in
educational assessments from judges and lawyers
This is therefore a useful distinction. It has value-added quality when
we consider that goals or objectives of other institutional forms such as the
police or business are much simpler than the complex values that
constitute the goals and objectives of higher education. This distinction is
important in clarifying the values that the higher educational establishment
19. Id. at 863.
20. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAWS (1962).
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promotes and defends. It is worth remembering the larger problem of laws'
internal values, and the external conditions and consequences that shape
its directions. For example, if Dred Scott or Plessy had been accepted as
reflecting the fundamental internal values of the legal systems
pronouncement on race-relations, we would in effect be accepting a
principle that would reify the impact of law and moral sensibility on the
character of race-relations. In doing so, we would have frozen the choice
between aspirations for citizenship based on "respect" and the tradition of
racial supremacy fed by social, cultural, and political prejudice. 21I would
therefore also submit that an external perspective is crucial to changing the
internal norms of law and the other social institutions. I do not believe that

21. The leading study on the nature of prejudice is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1954). The precise line that distinguishes prejudice from discrimination that is meant
to victimize the target is not always clearly maintained. But it is clear, that prejudice is a much
stronger form of discrimination when discrimination is used in the context of group deprivations
based on race, religion, or other labels of cultural identity. A further and insightful study is that of
Morris Ginsberg, Prejudice, Address Before the Central Jewish Lecture Committee at the Third
Jacques Cohen Memorial Lecture (Woburn Press, June 12, 1958). Ginsberg describes racial or
ethnic prejudice as comprising the following elements:
Firstly there is uncritical generalisation.This results in the attribution to all
members of a group qualities in fact only observed in a few. Second, there is
specification, or selective emphasis, that is the tendency to consider certain
qualities as specially characteristic of a group which are in fact to be found
equally commonly in other groups, e.g. when Jews are said to be ostentatious or
pushful. Thirdly, there is omission that is the tendency to overlook desirable
qualities in the group which is disliked, or when they are too obvious to be denied
to dismiss them as "untypical." Fourthly there is discrimination, that is the
tendency to condemn acts of one group which would be condoned or not noticed
or even praised when committed by others, for example, when similar acts are

considered as sharp practice in one case but regarded as showing business acumen
in the other, or when Jews are condemned as "money-minded" in a country where
competition and the striving for money are considered proper and normal for
everybody.
Other factors of importance are reliance on hear-say, suggestibility, selfdeception, conscious and unconscious, sophistication and rationalization. Once the
prejudiced beliefs are built up they tend to arouse emotions or passions similar to
those which originally gave rise to them and thus to sustain or intensify them.
They can impose themselves on the individual and become coercive and
intolerant. The mass of beliefs thus engendered tends to be supported by other
beliefs; for people like to think they have reasons for what they believe. In this
way systems of belief are built up which are highly resistant and blind to doubt or
criticism. The strength of prejudices and like that of dogmas lies not in the
reasoning on which they are based but in the mass of feelings behind them. Hence
they do not yield easily to reasoning 6r even to persuasion.
Id. at 9.
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Brown would have been possible without some elements of an external
perspective. Dean Kronman would likely not argue with this caution. It is
however worth stating to ensure a realistic perspective as a backdrop to the
discussion and justification of diversity.
In Brown, the "internal" perspective was in my view influenced by
"external" issues which were both empirical and normative. The reality of
racial prejudice in fact created second class citizenship. Second class
citizenship was incompatible with the moral, and by construction, the
juridical foundations of the principle of equality. This leads me to my first
concern in Dean Kronman's piece which has to do with the essential
narrative itself.
IV. UNPACKING THE NARRATivE

The narrative from DredScott to Plessy to Brown and beyond is a wellknown and generally agreed-upon one. I want to challenge the essentials
of that narrative. I want to shift the narrative from an emphasis on a linear
tracing of the case law to the rules behind the rules of the constitutional
adjudication. It is well known that the Supreme Court has used a
conceptual test to frame the discourse about the scope of Constitutional
supervision over, inter alia, race-relations. The close supervision test,
namely the strict scrutiny test, is the test around which the control and
regulation of race-relations by law has ultimately been based. The test was
originally articulated in a famous footnote from UnitedStates v. Carolene
Products.22 As the test has evolved, it remains unclear whether the
conceptual basis of test itself has been compromised by the Supreme
Court's use of the strict scrutiny standard to radically limit the policies of
affirmative action and possibly enter the future of diversity. Justice Stone's
strict scrutiny test was formulated against the problem in general of
minorities. The minority's problem, in fact, reflected the broader question
of the social and power context of group deprivations: in short, the
problems of group prejudice, deprivation, power and social conflict.
Because the conceptual basis of the test as reflected in CaroleneProducts
22. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote four of the CaroleneProductscase provides, in relevant
part:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, orracial minorities. [W]hether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted).
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would be useful in understanding the scope of its application in the context
of affirmative action cases, it is useful to give it some attention.
The Stone footnote z must assume some relevant feature of the social
and political environment within which law must function. If this is true,
we might acknowledge that there are two primary features of general
social context that emerge from the note: (i) the idea of an identifiable subgroup or "minority," and (ii) the idea of targeting that group as an object
of prejudice. The first idea is interesting. What could Stone have had in
mind by the terms "discrete and insular minority"?24 I suggest only two
possible things: it refers to the problem of "groups" in the larger processes
of national effective power. It assumes, however benign the political
climate, such groups if vulnerable to that political abuse can and should be
(a) identified and (b) protected by basic law. The second principle refers
to the form of "abuse" viz, prejudice. The historic reference may have had
African Americans in mind, or it may have had Southern European, East
European or Irish immigrants in mind. As Bruce Ackerman points out,25
Justice Stone has been clearly aware of the prejudice indicated in the
Nuremberg laws based on anti-Semitic Nazism, targeting the Jewish
community in Germany. What clearly must have influenced Stone is that
these European immigrants were largely "minorities" identified as such
and potentially subject to targeted prejudice.26 As a leading jurist of his
time, Stone would have been fully aware of the effort to protect minorities
and indigenous peoples through the League of Nations minorities and
mandate systems. Among the issues the League addressed were the
concerns about problems of power, prejudice, deprivation, and social
conflict. Our narrative thus starts with the core insights of Carolene
Products.
Now it will be recalled, in order to establish a framework for the
defense of diversity in higher education, Kronman provides us with a brief
narrative of the evolution of race-relations law. The narrative takes us to
Bakke and the "attractive" claim of Justice Powell that diversity is an
educational value and that race can be a factor in making an educational
judgment about criteria for admission to an institution of higher education.
The issues of social and racial justice and the strategies of affirmative
action, are now preempted by educational goals. Diversity is an
educational goal, and race and ethnic issues are matters of educational
value rather than social and racial justice. Perhaps these are discrete

23. See id.

24. Id.
25. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713,741 (1985).
26. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OFTHE RIGHTS
oFMINORITIES (1991) (see especially Part I, pertaining to the concept and history of the protection
of minorities).
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incommensurables; perhaps educational judgments however much we seek
to reasonably objectify them are more an internal art form than an external
objective science. What I think can be said with confidence is that to
collapse claims of social and racial justice into a claim for educational
value may in fact depreciate the claims to racial and social justice from a
moral and juridical perspective. Has diversity watered down the claims for
social justice? Has diversity or social justice enhanced the position of
white women, "white" elite Hispanics, and others in society? Has it
happened because it is based not on social justice but indirectly based on
the justification for racial diversity? That is to say, it is based on the
deprivations experienced by African-Americans. Does this diminish the
claims for racial justice based on social justice versus "diversity" grounds?
The story of Powell's "attractive" claim must be rethought. These complex
claims to social justice played out in a context of conflict pluralism
challenge the moral and juridical foundations of basic claims and basic
rights and are structured around a legal drama whose parameters are
defined by the CaroleneProductsfootnote.
V. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATrVE NARRATIVE
As U.S. law evolves from Dred Scott and Plessy to Brown and Bakke
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,27 a dramatic change takes place
in the context and normative issue which Stone's influential note
addresses. The words change, their meanings change, and a society of
conflict pluralism evolves from a society of alleged consensus pluralism.
But the conflicts endure. The deprivations based on race endure.
Deprivations and prejudice are moderated by more neutral terms and
prejudice becomes discrimination, but prejudice remains real. The term
minorities becomes a symbol for race. The terms "race" and "minorities"
have meaning and coherence only in the context of the social relations
context of power, privilege, and deprivation. The term "prejudice"
disappears from the legal lexicon and "discrimination" is substituted.
"Discrimination" is a serviceable term if the original content and purpose
of Stone's test is kept in mind. Brown, for example, deals with "racial
discrimination." The terms "racial discrimination" must be read
conjunctively. Read apart, or disjunctively from each other, they obscure
context and moral sensibility. The term "race" means nothing outside of
the context of power relations-conflict pluralism if you will. This means
that there is an "in-group" dominating a system of power relations. This
group may be a numerical majority (White Americans) or a functional

27. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
28. 347 U.S. at 490.
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majority (White, Apartheid South Africa). There must be an "out-group,"
identified by a culturally understood label of identity (race). To subject the
label "race" to strict scrutiny runs into the odd proposition that the
dominant group which creates the rules of affirmative intervention to
protect the subservient group does so by discriminating (distinguishing)
between itself and the others and inflicts "discrimination"/prejudice on
itself! This is literally true if discrimination is meant to make
"distinctions." It is not true if discrimination is a synonym for prejudice.
The dominant class, the White group, is now a "suspect" class.
The term race in the discourse seems to be decontextualized; it is in
effect far narrower than the term "minority" used by Stone. The term race
is virtually meaningless as a description of marginalized power (context)
and discrimination which in context can and should be read as prejudice.
In short, when the terms race and discrimination are vested with juridical
basic rights meanings, that is to say, construction which emphasizes
syntactics rather than semantics, there is no concept of racial
discrimination or racial prejudice in the Supreme Court's discourse, as in
Croson.29 We are led to the astigmatic view that any distinction in which
racial identification must perforce "exist" is "discrimination." Hence, the
result is the odd notion that whites are a discriminated class-reverse
discrimination. In my view, a white woman may make a case that there is
specific or institutional discrimination against her. A black woman may
make the same claim. But she is often a victim of racial prejudice and a
white woman is not. There is a case to be made for justifying the bringing
of women into the academy on grounds of social justice. The claims of
black women and men in the United States rest on a stronger case, more
than simply "discrimination," the case rests on prejudice. This is a factor
which constrains equal opportunity for African American people and
without an articulate strategy to remedy its continuing efforts, consigns the
vast human resources of the African American community to a vista of
perpetual marginality. Consider the following:
It remains to be added that the factors making for group
prejudice often operate in a circular manner. Thus in the case
of the Jews the inner tendency toward isolation encouraged
a policy of discrimination and discrimination in turn made for
further isolation. Similarly, as has been argued at length by
Myrdal in the U.S.A., white prejudice causes discrimination
against Negroes and keeps down their standard of living, and
the low standards in turn stimulate antipathy and further
discrimination. (An American Dilemma, Ch. Ill). Professor
MacIver has described in more detail how the conditions

29. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
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produced by discrimination tend to sustain it. The group with
greater power deprives the other group of the opportunities to
social and economic advance. The upper group is thus
strengthened in the sense of its own superiority. This in turn
is reinforced by the factual evidence of inferiority that
accompanies the lack of opportunity and the habits of
subservience resulting from a policy of discrimination. In this
way self perpetuating complexes of conditions making for
prejudice are created and sustained. (Cf. The More Perfect
3
Union, Ch. IV').
The core value of the "internal" perspective of diversity in higher
education is that it distinguishes diversity from affirmative action.
Diversity now holds an independent justification apart from the issues of
racial, gender, or social justice. The value of this perspective is twofold.
First, it limits the court substituting a legal judgment for an educational
judgment in the field of higher education. Second, it provides a degree of
academic autonomy from politicizing the issue of what "worth" is, or what
public good or public interest is, in access to higher education. This is a
good stop-gap strategy and it has received an articulate justification by a
distinguished educator who doubles as a lawyer. The procedural problem
is that it may by implication concede that racial justice is constitutionally
prohibited racism, and that the strategies of affirmative action cannot be
justified in either moral or juridical terms. If we accept the independent
and distinguishable justification for diversity, how do we justify
affirmative action? I suspect that there is confusion about the overlap of
diversity and affirmative action. It may be that many believed that Justice
Powell's "attractive" suggestion that race could be a factor in diversity
salvages affirmative action which would otherwise be infirm as reverse
discrimination. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hopwood v.
Texas,3 struck down the Texas diversity/affirmative action plan with an
understanding that it was fundamentally overruling the plurality in
Bakke. 2 That is to say, what Hopwood, and by fair "prediction" the U.S.
Supreme Court will do, is to accept the proposition that all (including
diversity-based) affirmative action is unlawful. The Hopwood decision
was based mainly in the jurisprudence of the Croson case, a case that
emerged from the allocation of local governmental contracts in which the
City of Richmond required a percentage of contracts be awarded to
minority businesses."3 Business values are not the same as higher
educational values. However, justifying diversity on the discrete terms of
30. Ginsberg, supra note 21, at 12-13.
31. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
32. See id. at 934.

33. Croson, 488 U.S. at 476.
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educational values. However, justifying diversity on the discrete terms of
higher educational values must not obscure the work of a slippery concept
like diversity in the larger national discourse about social and racial
justice.
VI. THE NARRATIVE CONTINUES
The term "diversity" is loaded with multiple meanings and
corresponding complex, sometimes resulting in incoherent social and legal
consequences. In the Bakke case, Justice Powell quoted a famous line from
Holmes, stating that a word is simply the skin of a living thought.3 4
Kronman's piece gives a feel for the texture of the skin and toys in a
complex but interesting way with the "life" under the skin. As a matter of
political theory, the term diversity obscures more than it possibly reveals.
For example, the term holds that race may be an element of diversity and
as such it is a factor that may lawfully be considered in the allocation of
social or educational goods. The reference to "race!' as "diversity" is not
the same thing as "race" and "prejudice." We may justify special
protections of law to the victims and the potential victims of racial
stereotyping supported by the animus of prejudice and the power base of
social control or dominance. Here we might see the justification of
"intervention" as designed to ameliorate social conflict based on racial
stratification. We may also seek justification in the idea that social peace
be sustainable peace; that racial prejudice not simply be prohibited or
proscribed, but that continuing policies and interventions on behalf of the
target group facilitate the emergence of transcendent identifications that
broader symbols of who is included in the "we" displace the symbols of
ethnic or racial rigidity based on the identification by racial pedigree of
"we" and the "other." But what does diversity have to do with social
conflict or social justice? Diversity, in effect, has been constructed by a
plurality of the Supreme Court as a substitute for the principal of
affirmative action.35 The principle of affirmative action and its vindication
in law is more complex than the negative principle of non-discrimination
as a legal norm. The principle of non-discrimination or non-prejudice
would be justified by the simple proposition that every human being is
entitled to a measure of equal concern and respect and that prejudice or
invidiously motivated discriminations destroy those values. Affirmative
action works on the principle, well accepted in international law, that
levels of social and/or racial or other forms of stratification are often
institutionalized matters and cannot easily be remedied without some form

34. University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
35. See id. at 311-15.
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of affirmative collective intervention. Such intervention could, of course,
require a public or moral justification.
In general, the precise justification for affirmative social interventions
might be predicated upon the principle that social or community peace is
a good thing and that deprivations which entrench hierarchy and
stratification reproduce social conflict often to the detriment of the
common good of the society as a whole. This principle could be extended
to include the idea that a society which either encourages or neglects vast
segments of its population, and reduces their opportunities in life to the
most minimal and dismal levels of participation in the social matrix of
values necessary for even the most minimal level of deference, dignity,
and respect, is a matter to be avoided. This must be done if necessary, by
active social, collective, or possibly even governmental intervention. In
effect, what this entails is a joining of issues on the values behind the
dominant ideologies of the emergent millennium. In short, the ideologies
of social democracy, liberal democracy, or perhaps even the basic ideals
of "New Deal" democracy are emphatically committed to the principle that
social justice is a political and juridical good and that the goods and values
of a defensible social order should be optimally produced and reasonably
widely distributed. If the freedoms of the market or the political
marketplace cannot affect a neater balance between production and
distribution, some forms of intervention may be necessary, although the
forms of intervention may strategically be complex arrangements between
the institutions of government, labor, capital, and civil society. At the heart
of a society opposed to social democracy is a juxtaposition of a society
structurally resembling a pyramid in which one might structurally
delineate the number of members of society who monopolize the upper
tenth of any and all values.
PYRAMID ILLUSTRATION

Diagram A36

36. See HAROLD D.LASsWELL&MYRESS.MCDOUGALJUISPRUDENCEFORAFREESOCIETY
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The social democratic geometrical figure resembles more the structure of
an onion or a turnip in which we see a vaster aggregate of people sharing
the middle, upper middle, and lower middle and only a small category
occupying the top and bottom portion.
TURNIP ILLUSTRATION

37

Diagram B

I use these illustrations to show that the ideological debate can often be
obscured and depreciated by the juridical debate. Moreover, the
development of juridical science and symbols often reshape the discourse
about the value issues at stake in ways that carry less illumination, greater
complexity, and perhaps an even greater capacity for greater social
mischief. The first point to note is that the concept of affirmative action as
a juridical construct carries both a strength and a weakness. Its strength
lies in the fact that it empirically references a target population of
deprivation. That population is disproportionately represented at the
bottom of the social pyramid or at the bottom of the social turnip. It
recognizes that in certain circumstances race, social stratification, social
dominance and deprivation are remarkably reflected in race relations. In
this sense, we are given an important indicator of how to organize social
strategies for the improvement of the element of social justice dominated
by the socio-political dynamic of racial prejudice. Here rules that target
"racial prejudice," "racial discrimination," "racial dominance," and
"invidious discrimination," facilitate the alleviation of injustice, and the
stigmatizing of vulnerable groups.
The analytical focus of several Supreme Court justices in race-relation
cases is in many ways astigmatic. These justices do not effectively

344 (1992).

37. See id.
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differentiate between labels or markers based on group identification for
the purposes of enhancing legitimate claims to social justice, equalizing
opportunity in access to social process values on the one hand, and
distinctions animated by brute, naked prejudice whose objective is to
deprive, stigmatize and freeze the social position of the historically
subjugated group so identified. The Albanian Minorities case, decided by
the PCIJ in 1927, has absolutely no problem analytically or practically in
making precisely this kind of distinction.3" The approach of the Supreme
Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins39 may in some degree be more compatible
with the practical approach to understanding racism. In Yick Wo, Justice
Mathews reviewed certain San Francisco ordinances, which, although
"neutral" on their face, indicated that whatever the manifest intent of the
ordinances, they represented state action "so unequal and oppressive as to
amount to a practical denial... of... equal protection of the laws .... ,40
The Court used the explicit language of practical denial. In words that
resonate with contemporary meanings, Justice Mathews continued:
"Through the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered... with an evil eye and unequal hand, so
as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their fights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution., 4 ' The stress on the
practical, the factual, "evil eye"; the facts of an "unequal hand" show a
remarkable capacity of the Court to distinguish between a beneficent social
policy and invidious prejudice. Yick Wo takes a quite functional approach
to the role of the Court in supervising race-relations.
Later cases seem to retreat from the Yick Wo approach. Washington v.
Davis,42 for example, seems to restrict the "evil eye" and "unequal hand"
theory of Justice Mathews. However, Justice White does concede that a
differential racial impact "solely" (that is without more) is insufficient to
sustain a constitutional transgression.43 Yick Wo clearly means or includes
more, than the term "solely" implies.
Moreover, a deep and important issue about the nature of racism is
rooted in the judicial assumptions of Yick Wo. These ideas reflect the way
in which racism may be triggered and the external manifestation of its
expression. An ostensibly neutral ordinance which seeks to prescribe brick
buildings might be seen in context to mean the targeting of the livelihood

38. Minority schools in Albania. Advisory opinion of the permanent Court of International
Justice 1935 P.C.I.J. (Series AIB) No. 64.
39. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
40. Id. at 373.
41. Id. at 373-74.
42. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
43. Id. at 239.
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of a discrete and insular minority. That minority may in the context know
exactly that brick buildings are meant to be economic discrimination
animated by racial prejudice. In other words, racism often emerges from
the private motives of personality types prediposed to prejudice. It
becomes socially relevant when those private prejudice-prone motives are
displaced on public objects. This means the acquisition and control of
privilege and property for the dominant group. That group is capable of
"displacing" its racist pathology, of deprivation, stigmatization and
prejudice (in the worst cases, genocide) on the dominated group. Finally,
there is the crucial tricky matter of packaging the malady: Racism is
rationalized as being in the "public interest." This means that racist
communication is not always of the grotesque and crude variety. It comes
in coded communications whose meanings must be teased out of context,
and indirect methods of investigation and analysis. Thus imperialist,
colonialist "racism"' comes packaged as the "white man's burden" or the
"dominant classes" "manifest destiny." In more contemporary contexts
such as South Africa's apartheid, the scheme of racial domination was
packaged as "separate development." Possibly the worst if not most
dastardly example of rationalization was indicated in front of the
Auschwitz death camp--"work" it read, brought "freedom." In a way this
was literally true, because those fit for "slave labor" were worked to
"death" and, given the horror of Auschwitz, death could actually be a form
of "liberation."
In the contemporary United States, race has been a long standing
instrument of political manipulation. Playing the "race" card has been a
hallmark of certain political factions, especially in conservative circles.
Thus ostensibly neutral words often convey racial meanings to certain
target groups. For example, to campaign on the issue of "crime" is a coded
symbol that culturally among whites identifies crime with race and
personal insecurity. Similarly the issue of "no new taxes" and the coded
phrase that accompanied it, viz., that we "read" the "lips" of the
communicator, means no social spending for the underclass who are
disproportionately black. When a presidential contender consciously visits
a university which prohibits black-white dating, he affirms an antipathy to
miscegenation. We can reverse the code quite deftly when we hold that a
social policy such as affirmative action is racial discrimination, thus
inverting the role of victimizer and victim.
A substantial element of racism is generated by unconscious
pathologies and thus there may be a measure of uncomfortable truth in the
principle of Socratic insight that "vice is ignorance." If further academic
license is to be drawn from Dean Kronman' s defense of moral philosophy,
it lies in the element of Socratic extremism which holds that an
unexamined life is not worth living. If the term unexamined is roughly
analogous to the terms "unconscious" or even "preconscious," then we
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may plausibly conclude that an unexamined life driven by unconscious
prejudices is a potentially lethal life from the point of view of the victim
who wants life without deprivations based on "otherness."
Indeed, the rules of affirmative action seek to ensure that we move
from the absence of stigmatization and dominance, to a vista of at least
reasonable access to the basic values implied in a defensible notion of
social justice. In effect, the former principle is more amenable to juridical
interventions because it essentially vindicates a principle of negative
freedom and equality. It essentially tells a state what it must not do. It may
not touch the question of prejudice and discrimination beyond the state.
That is to say, if we join issue with a discourse about the scope of
government, we will at once see that the bigger the government, the
greater the area of social control it determines and the greater the scope of
a court's capacity to police governmentally sanctioned prejudice and
discrimination will be. However, if we focus on minimum government,
then there is much less that the government regulates and much more that
is regulated by the market or the civil society, and therefore much less
scope for a court to intervene to prohibit invidious discrimination. If the
antipathy to racial prejudice is indeed deeply rooted, then social strategies
to develop a concept of racial justice may be quite useful. But it should be
understood that the concept of racial justice is an extremely limited form
of social justice from a social democratic perspective. So the larger
question emerges. When the Republicans created affirmative action what
exactly animated them? For example, while the Republicans were opposed
to the New Deal and its social democratic animating principles, they were
moved nevertheless to do something about the extreme forms of
deprivation based on race. Affirmative action may thus be seen as a
conservative strategic adjustment. From this point of view, affirmative
action is far more limited than a full-blown commitment to a theory of
social justice and flexible social upward mobility. This could be seen as
Nixonian conservatism cutting its losses.
It is possible that the original Republican support for affirmative action
also could have been motivated by the crudeness of playing a visceral race
card in electoral politics. In short, working class whites could now
possibly believe that their lower class status was a function of reverse
discrimination. The political value of attacking the limited notion of social
justice encased in the principle of affirmative action has of course
obscured the debate that working class, whites who are also socially,
culturally, and economically deprived, might too expect a form of social
concern that is generally tied to the social democratic culture of social
justice. This is not to equate the social deprivations animated by prejudice
and the social deprivations animated by class-based prejudices or the
imperfections of bourgeois democracy. The central point is that a
commitment to racial justice should not be construed to mean a
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disparagement with regard to social justice for others in society who by
birth, circumstance, or simply bad luck are stuck at the bottom of the heap.
The mutation of affirmative action in law by the invention of the
concept of diversity, so narrows whatever pretensions to social justice
reposed in the theory of affirmative action that one actually sees from an
ideological point of view a constitutional strategy with a modest sugar coat
that simply removes from legal and political discourse the watered down
version of social justice encapsulated in the affirmative action principle.
Diversity, as represented in constitutional jurisprudence, makes issues of
social justice or racial justice irrelevant to higher education. Diversity in
effect makes a very different claim. This claim is that educationally we are
enriched by diversity. The "education" value that is therefore the
"primary" basis for the normative component or value of the "diversity"
idea.

VII. THE NARRATrVE PROGRESSES FURTHER
Judges, it is widely acknowledged, come to their judging role with
perspectives of identity, needs, and expectations, both cultural and
professional. Their conduct as judges is influenced by matters of culture,
class, exigency, and temperament. They are above all influenced by the
role and traditions their predecessors have established in the "traditions"
of the judging role. One of the great issues of the 20th Century confronting
the Supreme Court has been the issue of social justice. It was the central
issue of the New Deal when politicians were pitted against a judiciary
committed to a conservative agenda. The battle played itself out with a
measure of "dignity" in which progressives advocated judicial restraint
and conservatives advocated "intervention." The struggle for social justice
was transformed by the burgeoning middle-class into a matter of issue and
interest-group politics and in this transformation African-Americans were
essentially an afterthought. The issue of racial justice (an expansion of the
New Deal mobility directed society) became a part of the larger landscape
of the New Deal: a kind of New Deal for those who had been excluded
because of race and historic circumstance. It is here that the narrative of
social justice as issue politics takes a strange detour. The pressures for
racial justice were enormous. Would a political commitment compromise
or enhance the larger issue of social justice or neutralize the social justice
issue?
It is here that Nixon provided the conservative master-stroke. The
Nixon-inspired "affirmative action" solution would separate racial justice
from social justice; it would at best be a narrow concession to social
progressivism and it would anger the working and underclass whites who
had not benefitted effectively from the New Deal and post-war prosperity.
Helping the black underclass would come at the expense of the poor white.
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It was a strategy with incredible political and electoral consequences.
More importantly, the Democrats could not "oppose" it, and the
Republicans could take credit that they were not "racist" while their fringe
groups could politically proclaim the real truth about racism and reverse
discrimination against the whites. The real narrative about social and racial
justice is about the deft preemption of the terms of an important national
discourse about the scope of social democratic values and about the role
of the rule of law in defending and protecting values. Indeed, grounded in
the fabric of social democratic values are the issues of social justice, of
racial justice, of private and public license versus economic, social, and
cultural equity, of shared respect and dignity on a rational basis.The
interplay of legal ideology and social democratic values emerges from the
discourse of the judges on the court themselves, as well as distinguished
commentators. From the perspective of social democratic values, the study
of Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River provides an empirical basis
for the increased quantum of shared respect for African-Americans
through social strategies like affirmative action.' Ronald Dworkin has
written impressively on the lack of coherence of Supreme Court
adjudication." For example, Dworkin found that "[t]he equal protection
clause is violated.., when its loss results from its special vulnerability to
prejudice or hostility or stereotype and its consequent diminished
standing... in the political community." It is important that Professor
Dworkin has as well reminded us (as did Justice Marshall ) that
"prejudice" or "hostility" is not the same thing as discrimination. The
technical language "strict scrutiny" which is used to identify White
Americans as a "suspect class" (this gets funny) is the key analytical
conundrum in the antipathy of the Court to affirmative action. What
meanings can and should this construction hold? In my view, a perspective
of not syntactic originalism but semantic expectation (original or not)
should provide a more rational tool of legal analysis. It is gratifying that
Professor Dworkin-has once more insisted that we see discrimination in
the light or darkness of racial prejudice.47 It is the kind of insight needed
to provide a more accurate narrative of America's race and ethnic
relations.

44. See generallyWILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OFTHE RIVER (1998).

45. See Ronald Dworkin, Affirmative Action: Is ItFair?,28 J. BLACKS INHIGHER EDUC. 79
(2000).
46. Id. at 80.
47. See id.
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VIR. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Dean Kronman initiates his narrative in terms of the problems of
political partisanship. We must be cautious of drawing an easy moral

equivalence between those who favor social justice and those who do not.
It is important, as I believe Kronman's piece makes clear, that we
acknowledge that the partisans who oppose diversity do not oppose it on
real internal grounds. They oppose it because as a political and legal
symbol its reference is to affirmative action. They oppose affirmative
action either on race-based grounds or an ideological antipathy toward
social democratic values. Affirmative action, as I have tried to underscore,
is actually a watered down version of a general commitment to these
values although it is a critical component of the strategy to ameliorate the
conditions of deprivation of the black underclass.
Where does this narrative lead us? I am in general agreement with the
broad strategy of Dean Kronman's defense of educational diversity.
Having said that, I am uncertain of the scope of his principle of transitional
value, in which race or ethnicity is a positive factor to be weighed in the
distribution of the benefits of higher education. The central factual
problem, that issues of racial or ethnic justice must confront, is the social
reality of "otherness" and prejudice. Dean Kronman may not be surprised
to know that antisemitism and racial hate group activity are alive and well
in the United States and other Western democracies. He will, of course, be
aware of the recrudescence of group or mass murder, ethnic cleansing and
genocide (for example, Bosnia, Rwanda). Racism indeed may be man's
most enduring and dangerous myth system. When one confronts the reality
of "otherness" in the context of the American dream, I confess that I am
a major pessimist. I certainly cannot count myself in the same league as
the paragons of non-racialism in the guise of such Justices as Scalia and
Thomas. The reality of a pluralistic society that is highly conflictconditioned is that social differentiation is a reality. Differentiation
requires cultural markers; cultural markers that target racial ethnic or
minority groups are the critical reality around which a society of conflict
pluralism is organized.
The politics of identity is not a per se good or a per se bad
phenomenon. It must be accessed against both empirical reality and the
normative priority a culture provides to the politics of inclusion or
exclusion. Stratification along race and economic lines and political
hierarchy are not matters that can simply vanish away in law or moral
theory. The brute reality is that racial ethnic markers are invariably
accompanied by prejudice and worse. Without a recognition of relative
powerlessness and of relative vulnerability, without a commitment to
ameliorating the conditions of political vulnerability and attendant
marginality, we move toward rather away from, both defensible liberal and
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defensible social democratic values. Liberal and social democratic values
are also encapsulated in globally sanctioned ideas about the premium we
give to human rights values and the commitment to equal respect and
dignity. The stakes, nationally and internationally, are indeed very high.
Dean Kronman might have purchased valuable time and autonomy for
higher education. However, we must be cautious that this does not
compromise our concern for the reality and ubiquity of prejudice in our
social process, and the dangers that prejudice and hatred hold for the soul
of the American experience. Thus the question of critically examining the
internal logic and standards used by the lawyers and judges as well as
external context of the impact of the Court's role in supervising a nation's
race relations law must be continually subject to careful, critical discourse.
Indeed, Professor Dworkin, whose work has been earlier referred to,48 has
done a great service in leading a humane discourse on the essential justice
and fairness of affirmative action.
One of the issues that ubiquitously emerges in the defense of those who
oppose affirmative action is that one cannot separate out the context of
justice and merits in any calculation of affirmative action. It might well be
recalled that the University of Florida College of Law itself got under the
standards bandwagon when an African American applied to be admitted
at a time when the school was still segregated. He was, of course, qualified
to get in on the same terms as most of his white colleagues. The faculty in
its own perceived wisdom decided to change standards just sufficiently
enough to block his admission. It might also be paradoxical to note that
members of the white majority have themselves long been beneficiaries of
at least a form of affirmative action. For example, prestigious universities
for a long period admitted Jewish Americans, on the basis, of the Jewish
quota. The Jewish quota was not designed to help Jews as minority; it was
designed to help marginally qualified whites who ostensibly could not
meet the establishments of criteria of "merit."
Similarly, in more recent times, Asian Americans too have been limited
by quotas. Apparently, Asian Americans tend to do better in terms of
testing criteria than white Americans. They too have been
"excluded"-held to quotas in order to benefit ostensibly less able white
students. These examples are not meant to defend or attack quotas. They
do represent a lead in to an important issue viz., diversity and the idea of
merit. Objectifying admissions criteria is usually symbolized by a number
reference to grades and standardized tests. This number may be modified
by other criteria of supposed merit. For the moment we might all agree that
Asians and Jews who scored highly on standardized tests may have been
discriminated against when others with lesser scores were favored. I want

48. See generally id.
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to briefly examine how standardized numbers square with the liberal value
attached to educational excellence or merit.
What I think can be said with some confidence is that the concept of
merit has had something of an elastic history. In as large a society as the
United States, grades are certainly an objective, but not necessarily foolproof standard of measurement, simply because there would be a
substantial difference between universities at the top of the academic
ladder and those at the bottom. And even within universities, specialities
are often of uneven quality. The reliance on aptitude tests, mainly coming
from private organizations whose objectives, methods, and possible
excessive claims of the predictability of "merit," may ultimately be more
an admissions expedient than a critical standard of objective achievement
or scientific predictability. I am uncertain whether implicit in the
Kronman's piece there is not a subversive challenge to the issue of how
merit squares with diversity. For example, standardized aptitude tests may
be too limited and too uni-cultural to be of value as a liberal educational
objective. That is to say, the issue of merit, value, or excellence is itself a
matter of intellectual controversy. For example, intellectual critics of the
status quo often see in conventional academic wisdom a coded signal
indicating an antipathy to dangerous knowledge and unsettling thinking.
To the extent that conventional academic wisdom finds institutional
expression in standardized testing, it may be the case that value
assumptions of a particular social group could represent a form of
cognitive empathy to one group of testers and cognitive dissonance to
another.
Conventional criteria of academic "merit" might also be seen as
academic orthodoxy, a concept consistently in tension with the idea that
the boundaries of enlightenment are never closed. Academic diversity, I
would hold, must as well include the idea that diversity challenges
academic orthodoxy. More than that, diversity may indeed be the lifeblood
of the drive to expand the horizons of what we know, and how we do the
business of knowing. In short, diversity is a synonym for the idea of
"change." There is an obvious parallel between this idea and the narrower
but very coherent approach taken by Kuhn in his pioneering work, The
Structure ofScientific Revolutions.In that great work, paradigm change is
inherent in doing science. The study seeks to understand the tension
between freezing orthodoxy and changing it by paradigmatic shifts. In
short, when the criteria of merit are defined, by administrative convenience
or academic turf-protecting strategies, or academic "orthodoxy,"
"diversity" itself becomes an issue of academic, social and political
conflict. Merit as orthodoxy and merit as diversity may be odd bedfellows.
In an oblique way, Dean Kronman addresses the issue of value
assumptions behind the humanities, the sciences and the issue of diversity.
It may be, as Kronman suggests, that diversity has a modest role to play
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in the hard sciences. But even here the approach cannot be unqualified.
There is a complex relationship between science, scientific responsibility
and values. Consider for example the following:
[V]aluejudgments cannot be derived from scientific insights.
The assertions of social science and value judgments may
legitimately be seen as two distinct types of statement. We
may ask, therefore, at which points in the sociologist's
research he encounters value judgments, and how he should
act in these encounters ....
Scientific inquiry begins, at least in temporal terms, with
the choice of a subject, and it is here that we find the first
possible encounter between social science and value
judgments. That the process of inquiry begins with the choice
of a subject is rather a trivial statement; but if we advance one
step further and ask on what basis a scholar chooses the
themes of his research, we have left the realm of triviality...
value judgments are often a factor in choosing a subject ....
... [T]he choice of subject is made in what may be called
the antechamber of science, where the sociologist is still free
from the rules of procedure that will later govern his research.
It is probably unrealistic to insist that value judgments be
eliminated from the choice of subjects; in any case it is quite
unnecessary, since the reason why a subject is regarded as
worth investigating
is irrelevant in principle to its scientific
49
treatment.
The essence of the matter is that science, social or natural, cannot be
entirely value-free. While training in methods and techniques of scientific
investigation may be relatively objective and in some measure transcend
culture, class, or ethnicity, the problem of what is relevant, what is selected
and used as a focus of scientific attention may be influenced by the
cultural, racial, or ethnic background of an investigator. An AfricanAmerican scientist may be more interested in a cure for malaria or
sleeping sickness than a first-world white scientist who may be more
interested in patenting a cure for heroin addiction. Value commitments and
value predispositions may deeply influence the what, where, how and why
of scientific education. Needless to say, these thoughts about merit and
values will influence the question of how effective standardized tests are
for including or excluding people with different value perspectives.
Diversity, therefore, might be seen as a quite slippery but important
vehicle for asking very fundamental questions about intellectual integrity

49. Ralf Dahrendorf, Values andSocial Science: the Value Dispute in Perspective (1957), in
6-7 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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and educational value. This comment concludes with a letter to Dean
Kronman.
Dear Tony,
I think your essay is an eloquent statement of a socially
responsible educator. It is an essay of considerable
intellectual refinement and value. I believe that it largely
succeeds in putting old- fashioned civility in an important
national conversation. I am however, uncertain about what I
should make of the transitional character of racial and ethnic
diversity as an aspect of racial and ethnic justice. If I may
hazard a prediction, it will be that the struggle for social
justice in general, and racial justice in particular, simply will
not be a transitional thing. As indicated earlier in this
comment, America is a melting pot of unmelted lumps. When
you and I make the great Transition, America will still be a
melting pot of unmelted lumps, and the struggle for equal
respect and dignity will continue.
As ever,
Winston

Postscript:
As I have come to the conclusion of this comment, I ask for a reflection
to its beginning. It is my hope that the three examples which began this
piece serve as an illustration of the problems that pervade higher education
today, and give the reader concrete examples of concerns which may at
times become abstract and theoretical. The human frailties that are
intertwined with both social and racial justice signal to us the sensitive
nature of this matter and the positive steps that we need to invent and
embrace. Through both Dean Kronman' s piece and mine, I believe that we
have taken the discourse of the subject of diversity beyond its current
parameters. Hopefully this will influence institutions of higher education
and operational thinking. The narratives highlight the problem, but there
has been progress, and I am confident there will continue to be progress.
I believe that our institutions of higher education are strong and will
survive political storms ahead. They will strive to enlighten, understand
and work on an inclusive basis to enhance the human prospect through
science and learning and the excellence inherent in the diversity idea.
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